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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
COUNTY OF ULSTER

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex.
rel. MARTHA RAYNER, ESQ.
on behalf of

Index No.

VERIFIED PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner,
-against ANTHONY ANNUCCI, Acting
Commissioner, New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision,

Respondent.

MARTHA RAYNER, an attorney duly admitted to practice law in the State of New York,
hereby affirms the following under penalty of perjury:
1.

I am a law professor at Fordham University School of Law and associated with the

law school’s clinical law office, Lincoln Square Legal Services, Inc., 150 West 62nd Street, New

York, NY 10023.
2.

I represent the petitioner,Mr.

DIN

|, in this litigation related

to his continued and unlawful detention by the New York State Department of Corrections and

Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), despite having been granted parole and his fulfillment of all
conditions of release to parole supervision.
3.

As the attorney in this case, J am fully familiar with its facts and records. The pertinent

allegations and facts are within my knowledge or known on infonuation and belief based on my
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communications with Mr.

his family, DOCCS, and the Attorney General’s office, as well

as my review of parole and court records and independent investigation.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
4.

Mr.

67 years old, has been incarcerated for nearly 47 years. He is

detained at Eastern Correctional Facility in Ulster County, New York, by respondent New York
State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision.

5.

In a decision dated April 9, 2021, Mr.

was granted parole. An open date

“upon receipt of approved field investigation” was set, with earliest release on May 19, 2021. In its
decision, the Parole Board stated: “The panel finds you have developed the tools to be law abiding in
the community and your release at this time is compatible with the welfare of society.” Ex. 1.
6.

On information and belief, by May 18, 2021, or earlier, all release conditions were

fulfilled, including approval of residency and Mr.
7.

Mr.

provided Mr.
8.

was due to be released on May 19, 2021.

uncle sent him “parole clothes” to wear upon his release, and DOCCS

with a three-month supply of his medications to take with him upon release,
Mr.

brothers flew in from California the night of May 18 th and his sisters

travelled the same day by car overnight from South Carolina. Mr.

reach the

siblings planned to

|Correctional Facility the morning of May 19, 2021 to greet Mr.

upon his

release.

9.

On May 18, 2021, Mr.

was given a hand- written post-it note from his

Offender Rehabilitation Counselor that stated: “Hold for SOMTA Article 10 review. No decision as

of 5/18/21. Call your family.” Ex. 2.
10.

Despite being granted parole and meeting all conditions for release, Mr.

was

not released to parole supervision on May 19, 2021, and remains indefinitely detained by Respondent.
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11.

Having been granted parole, Mr.

has a constitutionally cognizable liberty

interest, yet has been deprived of release to parole supervision without substantive or procedural due
process.
12.

Besides the above referenced post-it note, he has received no notice of the legal or

factual grounds upon which he is being indefinitely detained.
13.

Mr.

grant of parole has been functionally rescinded by Respondent yet he

has been afforded no due process.
14.

Although it appears Respondent has not released Mr.

“Article 10 review,” Article 10 does not authorize Respondent

to

because there is an

detain a subject of an Article 10

review without a couxt order.
15 .

Contact with the Attorney General’s office and DOCCS counsel’s office have

established that there is no court order authorizing DOCCS to detain Mr.
16.

Respondent simply has no legal authority to deprive Mr.

of release to parole

supervision under these facts.
17.

Accordingly, as set forth at greater length below, this verified petition seeks a writ of

habeas corpus ordering Mr.

immediate release on the grounds that his continued detention

violates his state and federal constitutional rights.
THE PARTIES
18.

Mr.

is serving a sentence of 15 years to life imposed after a conviction for

Murder in the Second Degree. Respondent is Anthony Annucci, Acting Commissioner of DOCCS,
in whose custody Mr.

is detained.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

19.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 7001. Venue is proper

in Ulster County because Mr.

is detained at

Correctional Facility, an Ulster County

prison located in this Judicial District. C.P.L.R. § 7002(b)( 1).
20.

No court or judge of the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over Mr.

and since the challenged detention does not directly arise from a formal order or decree, no appeal
has been taken. C.P.L.R. § 7002(c)(3), (5).

21.

A petition for writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate action because the remedy

sought is immediate release from DOCCS custody. See People ex rel. Johnson v. Superintendent ,

Adirondack Corr. Facility , 174 A.D.3 d 992, 993 (3 d Dept. 2019) (“[Pjetitioner has been granted an
open parole release date and will be entitled to immediate release if the mandatory condition is found

unconstitutional, rendering his claims cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding.”), aff 'das modified,
36 N.Y.3 d 187 (2020).

22.

No prior application for the relief sought herein has been made.

STANDING

23 .

1 make this emergency verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

Article 70 of the C.P.L.R. on Mr.

behalf, because he is presently detained outside the

county in which my office is located, further delay will cause him material and irreparable injury, and

the pertinent factual allegations are within my knowledge or on information and belief.

THE FACTS
24.

On April 6, 2021, Mr.

was interviewed by the Parole Board. He was granted

parole on April 9, 2021, receiving an “Open Date” of May 19, 2021.
25.

An “Open Date” is “the earliest possible release date . . . contingent upon the inmate
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receiving an approved residence in accordance with established residency restrictions and local laws.”
DOCCS Community Supervision Handbook at 12—13, 15, https://doccs.ny.gov/system/files/

documents/2019/05 /Community Supervion Handbook.pdf.
26.

Mr.

was convicted of Murder in the Second Degree for conduct that took place in

1974. He is not subject to the Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) or the Sexual Assault Reform
Act (“SARA”).

27.

On infonnation and belief, Mr.

proposed residency with his aunt and uncle

was approved by a parole officer and thus there were no impediments to Mr.

release on

May 19, 2021.

28.

Instead, the day before Mr.

was scheduled to be released,he was handed a post-

it note that read: “Hold for SOMTA Article 10 review. No decision as of 5/18/21. Call your family.”
Ex. 2.
29.

It has been 70 days since Mr.

shouldhave been released and he has not received

any notice of the legal and factual basis for his detention, nor been given an opportunity to be heard

before an independent and impartial court.
ARGUMENT
30.

DOCCS lacks authority to unilaterally detain Mr.

he has been granted parole. Handing Mr.

without due process after

a post-it note does not meet constitutional due

process requirements.

31.

Mr.

was granted an open parole date in May 2021. All conditions for his

.

release were fulfilled, yet DOCCS did not release Mr

There is nothing in Article 10 that

authorizes DOCCS to unilaterally refuse to release a person who has been granted parole and has an
approved residence.
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32.

Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law requires three stages of review before the

filing, by the Attorney General, of an Art. 10 petition seeking a civil management order. There are
no enforceable limits as to the duration of any one of the three stages.

Notably, Article 10

contemplates that some subjects of an Art. 10 review will be at liberty during such review, and thus
provides a mechanism to secure such persons after the filing of an Art. 10 petition. In addition, Art.
10 contemplates that some individuals may be eligible for release before the review process has been

completed and thus provides a mechanism for the attorney general to obtain a securing order from a
court

before the filing of an Art. 10 petition.

Art. 10 does not authorize detention during the review

process without a court order.
33 .

Enacted in 2007 as part of the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act

(“SOMTA,” L. 2007, ch. 7), Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law, M.H.L. §§ 10.01-17, “sets out

procedures for determining whether a ‘detained sex offender’ is a ‘ sex offender requiring civil
management ”’

essentially, requiring commitment “to mental hospitals, rather than [] release[],

when their prison terms expire.” People ex rel. Joseph II. v. Superintendent

of Southport

Corr .

Facility , 15 N.Y.3 d 126, 130, 132 (2010). The centerpiece of Article 10 is a trial at which the State
must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a detained sex offender “suffers from a mental

abnormality as defined in that statute” and should be civilly managed instead of released. State v.

Floyd Y , 22 N.Y.3d 95, 99 (2013 ).
34.

A person deemed subject to civil management under SOMTA is, among other defined

persons, “A person who stands convicted of a designated felony that was sexually motivated and

committed prior to the effective date of this article.” M.H.L. § 10.03( g)(4).
35.

Article 10 establishes a multi-step process for the review and referral of persons who

may be subject to SOMTA and are approaching release. The Court of Appeals has referred to it as
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“an internal administrative review procedure that may—but usually does not . . .

result in a sex

offender civil management petition.” State v. Rashid, 16 N.Y.3d 1, 14 (2010); see also NYS Office of
Health,

Mental

2020

Annual

Report

on

the

Implementation

of

SOMTA,

https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/ statistics/ somta_report_2020.pdf (of 1,645 referrals for Art. 10 review
from November, 2019 to October, 2020, 2.5% were recommended for civil management).
36.

At the outset, the relevant agency—here, DOCCS—must alert the Attorney General

and the New York State Office of Mental Health [OMH] that a person who may be subject to civil
maintenance is “nearing an anticipated release from confinement.” M.H.L. § 10.05(b). The agency
must aspire to “give such notice at least [ 120] days prior to the person’s anticipated release,” but its

failure to do so has no effect. Id. (“ ... failure to give notice within such time period shall not affect
the validity of such notice or any subsequent action, including the filing of a sex offender civil
management petition.”).

37.

This notice triggers the first stage of OMH review. After OMH receives the referral,

its staff conducts a “preliminary review” of “relevant medical, clinical, criminal, and institutional
records, actuarial risk assessment instruments and other records and reports” to determine “whether
the person who is the subject of the notice should be referred to a case review team for evaluation.”

M.H.L.§ 10.05(d).

38.

If OMH determines that further review by the case review team is warranted, the

subject receives notice of the referral and the second stage of review takes place. M.H.L. § 10.05(e).
A “case review team” conducts a review of all relevant records and may “arrange for a psychiatric

examination” of the subject. Id. The review is supposed to be completed “within [ 45 ] days of the
commissioner [of mental health] receiving the notice of anticipated release”—but as with the 120
days for initial notification, any failure to do so has no effect. Id. § 10.05 ( g) (“However, failure to do
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so within that time period shall not affect the validity of such notice or finding or any subsequent

action, including the attorney general's filing of a sex offender civil management petition subsequent
to receiving the

39.

finding of the case review team.”).

If the case review team concludes that civil management is warranted, the team

informs the subject and the Attorney General. M.H.L.§ 10.05(g). That notice must include a “written
report from a psychiatric examiner that includes a finding as to whether the respondent has a mental

abnormality,” and where the underlying conviction is a “designated felony, it shall also include the
case review team's finding as to whether the act was sexually motivated.” Id.

40.

The Attorney General then conducts the third stage of review to determine whether a

civil management petition is appropriate, subject to a 30-day window that again has no practical
effect. Id. § 10.06( a) (“The attorney general shall seek to file the petition within thirty days after
receiving notice of the case review team' s finding, but failure to do so within that period shall not
affect the validity of the petition.”).
41.

The filing of a petition triggers the right to counsel and mandates a probable cause

hearing within 30 days. Id. § 10.06(c), (g). If probable cause is established, the subject may be
confined pending completion of the aforementioned jury trial. Id. §§ 10.06(k), 10.07(a); State v.
Rashid , 16 N.Y.3 d 1, 8 (2010).
42.

Art. 10 specifically contemplates that some persons subject to an Art. 10 review will

be at liberty during the three- stage review process. There is a procedure in place to secure those
persons should an Art. 10 petition be filed. If the subject of the OMH investigation was released after

DOCCS gave notice to OMH and is therefore at liberty when the petition is filed, the Art. 10 “court

shall order the respondent's return to confinement, observation, commitment, recommitment or
retention, as applicable, for purposes of the probable cause hearing.” M.H.L. § 10.06(h). In such a
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case, the probable cause hearing must “commence no later than seventy-two hours from the date of

the respondent's return.” And, if, after the filing of petition, but before a probable cause hearing can
be held, the Art . 10 respondent should become eligible to be released, “the court shall order the stay
of such release pending the probable cause hearing.” Id.
43 .

There is also a process to secure persons who may be released during the review

process, but before an Art. 10 petition has been filed. The Attorney General may (but is not required
to) seek a “securing petition” through the process laid out in § 10.06( f):

[I]f it appears that the respondent may be released prior to the time the
case review team makes a determination, and the attorney general
determines that the protection of public safety so requires, the attorney
general may file a securing petition at any time after receipt of [ the
initial] written notice pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 10.05 of
this article (emphasis added).

Although phrased as a unilateral action, at least two courts have described this as a “securing order”
process requiring judicial intervention before detention can be ordered. See State v. Randy M., 57

A.D.3 d 1 157, 1158 (3 d Dept. 2008); State v. Robinson , 21 Misc. 3 d 1120(A), 2008 N.Y. Slip Op.

52111(U), at * 1 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 2008).

44.

The “statutory language demonstrates] that the Legislature contemplated the release

of a detained person prior to a determination by the case review team or the filing of a petition.”

People ex rel . David NN. v. Hogan , 53 A.D.3 d 841, 844 (3 d Dept. 2008) ( And at fin. 3 noting that
OMH’s detention of petitioner during an Art. 10 review “was with no legal authority.”); see also

Rashid , 16 N.Y.3d at 15 (reciting the State’s position that “the Legislature contemplated an offender’s
release prior to the filing of the petition”). An Article 10 civil management petition can still be validly

lodged even if a person is not confined, so long as he or she is “still subject to State supervision.”

Rashid , 16 N.Y.3d at 17; see also Abreu v. Stanford , 153 A .D.3 d 1455, 1456 ( 3 d Dept . 2017)
9
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(addressing an Article 10 petition initiated by the Attorney General after “petitioner was released on
post-release supervision”).

45.

Nothing in this process contemplates or allows the referring agency—here DOCCS

to unilaterally detain a person subject to an Art. 10 review.

46.

The power to detain a person subject to an Art. 10 review or a respondent after the

filing of a petition by the Attorney General, rests in the courts, not with DOCCS.

47.

Here, Mr.

has been detained for over two months without a court order. He has

received no information as to whether DOCCS referred his case to OMH, whether OMH has commenced

the review process and, if so, at what stage is such review. What may or may not be taking place is
wholly opaque to Mr.
48.

Mr.

Since there are no enforceable limits to the duration of each stage of the review process,

detention could continue indefinitely.
49.

This indefinite detention is proceeding without any notice of the legal or factual basis for

the detention and without an opportunity to be heard before an independent court.
50.

There is no indication that the attorney general has filed a securing petition or is even

inclined to do so—or, for that mutter, that a securing petition of indefinite length without review could
pass constitutional muster. See Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer , No. 07 CIV. 2935(GEL), 2007

WL 4115936, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007) (expressing doubt that anything other than “a short

period of detention” before a judicial hearing would be a “constitutional application” of M.H.L. §
10.06( 0).
51.

That Mr.

received an open parole date does not diminish in any way his

entitlement to immediate release. “[ A ] New York inmate who has been granted an open parole release

date,” unlike a “mere applicant for parole,” has “a legitimate expectancy of release that is grounded
10
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in New York’s regulatory scheme,” and therefore possesses a “protectable liberty interest that entitled
him to due process.” Victory v. Pataki , 814 F.3d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).
52.

While the New York Court of Appeals has held that the liberty interest in question is

not enough to prevail, on rational basis review, in a substantive due process challenge against legal

impediments to release, such as SARA restrictions, see People ex rel. Johnson v. Superintendent ,
Adirondack Corr . Facility , 36 N.Y.3d 187, 199, 203 (2020), here there is no actual law, regulation, or
other condition acting as a counterweight to Mr.

liberty interest in immediate release.

Under both procedural and substantive due process, his liberty interest easily prevails over the absence

of any legitimate reason for his continued detention.
53.

In Johnson, the petitioners had been accorded procedural due process as to the SORA and

SARA determinations. Having been found to be level III offenders after notice, appointment of counsel,

and a hearing, they were subject to detention until SARA compliant housing was obtained despite one
petitioner having reached his maximum date, but remained on post release supervision, and the other
petitioner having been granted parole. Id. at 193-194. Mr.

is not subject to SORA or SARA,

and his residency has been approved by DOCCS.
54.

That Mr.

.

is apparently under review by OMH pursuant to Art. 10 does not

alone, authorize detention without a basis in law and appropriate procedural due process. As explained
above, the only law which allows for detention before the filing of an Art. 10 petition, is M.H.L. §10.06(f),

which if the attorney general choose to utilize would require a level of procedural due process
commensurate with the liberty interest at stake. 1 See Mental 1I vgicne Legal Serv. v. Spitzcr, 2007 WL

1

does not suggest that a securing petition would be either justified or lawful in his case—
Mr.
merely that it provides the only statutory option for his detention prior to the filing of a civil management
petition.
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4115936 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), affd sub nom. Mental Hygiene Lcual Servs. v. Paterson. 2009 WL 579445
(2d Cir. 2009) (discussing “serious” potential procedural due process concerns pending how § 10.06( f) is

applied, but declining to rule the statute facially unconstitutional).
55.

For these reasons, DOCCS’s continued detention of Mr.

violates his rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as ArticleI, Section 6 of the New
York Constitution. Mr

respectfully requests that the Court grant his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus and order DOCCS to release him.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Court

1.

Issue a writ of habeas corpus and order Mr.

immediate release, on the

grounds that his continued detention violates his rights under the United States and New York
constitutions, and is otherwise unauthorized by law or regulation; and

2.

Grant any other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: July 28, 2021
New York, NY

a Rayjier
f
Pro Bono Attorney for Petitioner
Lincoln Square Legal Services, Inc.

Fordham Law School
150 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
(212) 636-6941
mrayner@lsls.fordham.edu
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VERIFICATION

Martha Rayner, an attorney admitted to practice law in New York State, an attorney admitted to
practice in the Courts of this State, hereby affirms under the penalties of perjury that the contents of
this petition are true based on my personal knowledge, except for those matters alleged to be based
upon information and belief, which I believe to be true. This verification is made by me and not by
petitioner because the majority of the relevant facts are known to me exclusively and petitioner resides
outside of New York County, where my office is located.

ayner, Esq.

Dated: July 28, 2021
New York, NY

^

Sworn before me on

, 2021.
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